THE STANDARD-TIMES, NEW BEDFORD, MASS., THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 28, 1944. PAGE 5 The Truth of Pearl Harbor (An Editorial) By BASIL BREWER, Publisher, The New Bedford (Mass.) Standard-Times Pearl Harbor is the saddest chapter in the history of America "On the other hand, the probability since the Atlantic Confer- Here, in one hour, was destroyed the Pacific battle fleet chief ence, which On Nov. 27, 10 days before Pearl Harbor, General Short advised discussed these matters with President weapon to restrain Japan from weapon with which to that the United herself attacked, would come into Washington he had ordered Hawaii "alert No. against sabotage, win, if war came. the in Far thus make the final victory assured, and details what measures he had taken, Here were wiped out 4,000 officers and men of the American seemed to allay some of these anxieties, and that expectation has not Washington knew of and did not disapprove these "defense Army and Navy. been falsified by the events.' steps, solely against sabotage. Innocent of responsibility, they died in a classic funeral pyre, July 24, the United States had "frozen" Japanese funds Sabotage third in the list of attacks most expected by Knox in built for them by criminal negligence of others. Immediately after the Atlantic Conference, commercial embar- January, had No. of those expected in Washington and Pearl Harbor as Dec. Pearl Harbor, which, as the Japanese planned, made impossible goes, against steel and gasoline, were ordered which only could approached. relief of the Philippines, may have been responsible for that other result in It is not sabotage which competent military leaders, in Wash- great and Corregidor. This writer believes the President, in all these matters, made the ington or Pearl Harbor, would normally most fear, as war with Japan approached. Pearl Harbor marked the beginning of war with Japan. correct decision-in the country's interests-tha history shall so It may well have finished any hope of an early successful ending record. As Dec. 7 approached, the "incident," which would bring war of the war. With equal impartiality, history shall record that the President, with Japan, was daily, almost hourly expected in Washington. Japanese out of his political genius, perhaps two fatal errors, which Historically, the sinking of the battleship Maine in Havana har- Certainly the victims there, those who paid the "last full measure may have brought on the disaster. bor on Feb. 15, of sabotage, had brought with Spain. of devotion" were not to blame for the disaster. Who were to blame for Pearl Harbor? Certainly these contributed greatly to the disastrous success of By some strange twist, the President, and to some extent the the attack. military leaders in Washington "Battleship Maine' state Surely here, if ever, there was guilt and there were guilty. mind, when the attack occurred, or at least were to the last hours POLITICS before the attack. Who were the guilty and why have they not been apprehended, tried, convicted and punished? The working agreement with Churchill being what it was, the This explains why the battle fleet was docked each ship at its danger to the country being apprehended-the President failed to station, awnings the planes were grounded wing wing, WHY? take the people into confidence, unarmed, ammunition for guns and planes locked in magazines, This was the President's political bent. when Japan struck Dec. The President had said Jan. 7, 1941, 11 months before Pearl Harbor: A statesman long would told the people the facts-and The Army at Pearl Harbor on Dec. 7. interpreting its instruc- "When the dictators are ready to make war upon us, they will risen or fallen with the consequences. tions from Washington, was "alerted" for sabotage only. not wait for an act of war our part. They, will choose the Democracy rises or falls, lives or dies, based on how well this Had Hawaii "alert No. 3" been ordered, by General Short, the time, the method and the place of their attack." thesis understood and followed. Japs might never have struck, certainly the damage would have been But the President of that talent nor taste far less. Why, then, were we "surprised" at Pearl Harbor? than trusted the people, he trusted his own facility In Aleutian Islands, at Dutch Harbor. where military Why was the battle fleet there, each in its place, names and exact of expression, ability, the use of facts, to get orders only had to be followed. bomber were cruising with live the Japanese flyers to receive the tor- the people to think he them to think. bombs racks, U S. fighters. with live ammunition in guns, when pedoes, made especially for this attack? this formula had seemed the President not to the attack came to Pearl Harbor Dec. 7. Why was the air arm of the Army there, herded together, un- have worked badly in eight years of the Presidency and three elec- armed, for the kill? tions for President. DISASTER Should the Pacific battle fleet have been at Pearl Harbor on true also, this was the only method the President knew. But it not alone the "sabotage psychology" at Pearl Harbor for Dec. Secretary Hull had said, questioned about apparent which the President must accept his share of responsibility tion in Washington, "governments which get too far ahead of the And, if it should not, why was it there, and by whose orders? people are apt to fall. There were blunders there, both of omission and commission, which he must shoulder. INVESTIGATIONS The President, in the grave war situation in the Fall of '41, had gotten far ahead of for the people ever to The Commanders at Pearl Harbor had warnings of danger. Four different "investigations" of Pearl Harbor have been con- catch up by anything which he, by that time, could But with every warning, one, came a "precaution," which ducted-all secret. Fortunately can depend two the President's tied their hands psychologically if not actually. Only one "report" has been made, the report of the Roberts friends and biographers the facts this stage the crisis. As the danger became and Pearl Harbor closer, the Commission. released few weeks after Pearl Harbor. Forrest Davis and Ernest Lindley, friends of the President, became more definite, more insistent, more urgent. Of the 127 witnesses who testified in the Roberts investigation, had access, through the confidential information, from These precautions came direct from White House. the of none has been made public. which they produced early in 1942, "How War Came. The only warning message that Kimmel and Short received, Of the hundreds of documents studied and put in the record in This is from page 305 under the title, "The Sands Run Out- which contain definite precautionary orders, was the one the Roberts investigation, none has been made public. Pearl Harbor" from Secretary of the Navy Knox January Why have not these documents been made public? any, high officials elieved, however, that the United months Pearl and long before the The Roberts report blamed General Short, commanding general would, or could, stand aside for long if the Japanese struck expected which would kick off hostilities, was expected. of the Army, and Admiral Kimmel, of the fleet the East Indies or Malaya, even thrust into Siam. For stake Here the precautions, which accompanied each "warning," Pearl Harbor for the disaster. were only immediate vital to but resources and stra- as told in the Roberts report As result of the findings of the Roberts Commission, both have affecting security as nation. Oct. 16. as and Short were warned of danger by Wash- been tried by court-martial The question perplexing many high officials was how, in the ington, they were do nothing which would "constitute Kimmel Short, members of Congress and many others re- as absence of a direct Japanese attack the American flag, to summon against Japan. peatedly have demanded the trials be held. Today, more than 2 1/2 years after the report of the Roberts the nation, divided as it then was on questions of foreign policy, Nov. 24, 13 days before Pearl Harbor, Kimmel was enjoined to strictest secrecy, any defense moves he made "to prevent compli- neither Short nor Kimmel has been brought to trial. the strong action which they believed essential. cation of tense existing situation. It urged, shortly after Pearl Harbor, that trials would inter- "There had been considerable discussion of possible methods fere Nov. 27. came the most serious warning yet, from the Chief of It was commonly supposed that the Japanese were too smart Staff to Short, but with Certainly now, almost three years after the disaster, no such an order that under no circumstances validly can be made. to solve this problem the President by direct assault on the he to take any steps or make any moves that would make it appear More than the late Secretary of the Navy Knox wrote American flag-especially Hawaii, which even the extreme iso- the had committed "the first overt letter saying public trials of Kimmel and Short could not affect lationists recognized as a bastion of our security.' the the war. Surely this is plain enough. In the same message "reconnaissance" was ordered but only "in Very recently sub-committee of the House Military Affairs "As the Sands Ran Out at Pearl Harbor," the Japanese "solved such a way as not to alarm the civil population or disclose intent' Committee stated public trials would not with the war. the problem for the President by direct assault on the American flag. Here a military authority must have thought of the possibility Why, in justice, not these trials been publicly held, that those may be guilty, President, in the last weeks before Pearl Harbor, required such an order might tie the hands of the commander, for there was punished, and, freed? inserted: Why have not the American people been told the truth about an "incident" that would enable the people to catch up with him. Pearl Pearl Harbor gave the President far more of an incident than (General Short) was not to be restricted to any course, Harbor? which would jeopardize defense Truth, which they need in order properly to appraise their mili- he needed. his wanted. tary and political Born optimist, the incident the President expected was to be Nov. 28, nine days before Pearl Harbor, Short was cautioned their policies. glancing blow-but the blow came full and head-on at the whole again that any protective measures he took, "must be confined to Truth, which they need to appraise their own share, if any, in the body the country. those essential to security" and he must avoid "unnecessary pub- Truth, which they need to better guide themselves, as citizens- Moreover was not the kind of an incident he had in mind, as licity and alarm." in the interest of the country war. shall be disclosed. was the next day, Nov. 29 Secretary Hull stated, "The diplo- The American people grew old overnight at Pearl Harbor. THE FLEET matic part our relations with Japan is virtually over and the mat- Why they being treated as children, who must not be told? Pearl Harbor was the Gethsemane of the American people, as Naval strategy opposed having the Pacific fleet based at Pearl ter will now the officials of the Army and Navy." well of the soldier dead. Harbor. Nov. 29, eight days before Pearl Harbor, Kimmel was ordered Three or more high admirals had opposed it, including Kimmel. to "take no offensive action until Japan had committed the first Why not the truth, no matter how hard to take, to cleanse the soul-perhaps to bring temporal, as well as spiritual, salvation? Admiral Richardson of Kimmel, was removed from the resident because, among other Nov. 30, seven days before Pearl Harbor, Kimmel received the things, he opposed basing the fleet at Pearl Not even the truth, as to the Pearl Harbor dead, was known, The fleet Pearl by orders of the President, though last warning message to reach Pearl Harbor before the attack. until long afterwards. of course no such as there Dec.' It was a copy of dispatch sent to Admiral Hart Manila, The the destruction of the battle fleet were withheld of diplomacy, and judged by the Presi- ordering certain scouting, but again with the admonition, to "avoid for then released with news of successful salvage oper- dent, required powerful fleet based Hawaii, threat and the appearance of attacking.' ations. to Japan, the only kind the Japanese could understand. None of these precautionary orders came from military authori- WAR In no other way, the judged, could the U. hope to ties in Washington. though all came through military channels. keep open the British, and our own, lines from the Far East. None of these precautionary orders at Pearl Harbor ever was For a year or more prior to Pearl Harbor, it had been clear to These supply lines, the President had told Grew were vital. withdrawn. official Washington only miracle or American surrender could keep These were the supply lines the President and Churchill had One of the last warning messages sent to Pearl Harbor the United States out of the European and war with Japan. agreed to defend together at the Atlantic Conference changed by the President, personally, to insert the usual precaution. Japan had signed the Tripartite pact with Hitler, binding her to The admirals were opposed to basing the main fleet at Hawaii, The official explanation, of course, that, if came, the war with the war with Hitler came. because they believed the fleet there was too confined, too exposed President wanted the record to show he had done all he could to Japan notified Ambassador Grew, in the Spring of 1941, the to possible attack. prevent it. pact meant what Knowing the power of the Japanese fleet, high officers of the But on Nov. 29, eight days before Pearl Harbor, as stated, the Grew had advised Washington Navy had for years questioned its ability to meet the Japanese suc- Secretary of State had said "the matter will now go to the officials of Concurrently, Japan's course of conquest clearly pointed to the cessfully in Far Eastern the Army and Navy." Dutch East Indies, Singapore, Burma, possibly India, if not the Defending the Philippines always had been considered difficult. The Roberts in number 15 of its conclusions quotes Philippines Certainly this thesis had not been changed by large increases the many precautionary orders from Washington cause the That Britain could successfully meet this attack, without help, the Japanese Navy and the fact the U. S. fleet in '41 was divided success of the Pearl Harbor attack, though the report does not fix was dubious indeed. between the Pacific and the Atlantic. the responsibility convoyed supplies, loaned destroyers, etc., would not Additionally, the admirals opposed using the fleet at Hawaii as The last full fatal week before Dec. 7. 1941 the Roberts report suffice if Japan attacked Britain. a threat to Japan does not show single message from Washington to Kimmel and Therefore, the President faced, early in '41, the two horns of Such an approach, they considered was apt to result in "back- Short Pearl Harbor. dilemma. ing into the war," instead of the more forthright and direct method, now known Washington had, during this week, information He must decide whether to join Britain in stopping Japan- which they favored of greatest importance, which Short and Kimmel didn't receive until which meant war. What the admirals didn't know was, we were, to all practical after the attack Or he must take the chance, which seemed a certainty, that purposes, already in the war. without the U. actively fighting, the Tripartite would de- were watchfully waiting for the "incident" which would This is the real story of Pearl Harbor seven warnings of danger feat Britain, force Russia to peace-and attack the make the war, already a foregone conclusion "politically possible.' to the commanders there, six confusing and contradictory "precau- That the President had determined on seems indisputable. A plan of co-operation with the British Eastern fleet had tions,' which tied their hands. On Jan. 21, 1941, he wrote Ambassador Grew Tokyo that the been required the U. S. fleet to be as near as prac- Word available the last fatal most needed at Pearl of British supply lines from the Far East was vital. tical to was sent. On 14, 1941, Dooman, Counselor of the American Embassy Japanese knew the full meaning of the U. S. fleet at Pearl in Tokyo told the Japanese ice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Okashi Harbor. Obviously the President, "as the sands ran out" at Pearl Harbor, that, if the Japanese attacked Singapore, "the logic of the situation plan of the Japanese, including the latest by Kinoaki was definitely expecting Japanese attack would raise the question' that this would mean war also Matsuo. Three Power Alliance," in 1940. plainly But the nearer it was expected, the more careful he became with the stated with U. Japan the U. S. On Feb. 26, 1941, Ambassador Grew reported Dooman's con- Pacific fleet were to the that when the attack should come, it should be such as the isolation- Philippines. ists could not tie onto himself. ference to Washington, We were, the time of Pearl Harbor, waiting for an "incident" The attack which came at Pearl Harbor Dec. 7, was one which to to Matsuoka (Japanese foreign minister), which would start the "isolationists' could not tie onto the President with whom this morning that statements The Japanese, having in mind basic Japanese strategy, that the made by Mr. Dooman to Mr. Okashi were made with my prior fleet of the U. get to a long time had But the success of the attack can, in part, in all fairness, and in been preparing the "incident." such measure each citizen shall judge, be placed at the door of the and have full approval." did not disapprove nor disavow Dooman's and The President, and others, in Washington, first had lulled the Grew statements. SABOTAGE at Pearl Harbor into expecting only-sabotage In April 1941, Naval authorities in Washington had written the Having overruled his admirals in basing the Pacific fleet at Pearl The President then had given them such restraining precautions of the Asiatic and Pacific fleets that the question of Harbor, would be expected that the President, of all persons, would and orders they not know what they could or dare do-in entry into the war seemed a matter whether-but make most certain no disaster came from the fleet's being there. measures of protection and defense. when." Doubtless the President thought he had arranged. The Japanese, as Davis and Lindley had said, solved the prob- By the time of the Atlantic Charter meeting between Churchill It fact. however, the President by his acts, unwittingly lem of how to the nation against isolationism for the Presi- and Roosevelt, early in August '41, events in Asia were moving with of course, contrived bring of the Japanese attack. dent Pearl Harbor. tremendous and ominous speed This not in the that he has been commonly accused, But, in trying to keep "the record clear, the President un- Churchill, the and the Dutch urged an immediate running all the way from plotting the attack, ordering the fleet and had to destruction Japan pursued her expected course. protected to appease the Japanese- of which are false. the Pacific battle fleet, had helped to bring about Bataan and Cor- Responding to the argument for an immedia ultimatum, the The President's responsibility is nevertheless direct and definite. regidor, had lengthened immeasurably the Japanese war. President.only asked not be better off in three Early in January, Secretary of Navy Knox had sent warning And then said, "Leave it to me. I think can baby them (the to both Army and Navy chiefs at Pearl Harbor suggesting the dan- "WHY?" Japs) along for three months.' ger of a surprise bombing attack by air against fleet at Pearl This of course explains many things. There was no disagreement between the President and Churchill Harbor It explains the long delay of the court-martial of General Short to Japanese that Japan must be stopped. had been a foregone conclusion, if war with Japan came, it and Admiral Kimmel. as Probably there was no disagreement that an ultimatum meant would begin by surprise attack, the Japanese way, as the President It explains why the President, through members of Senate and himself had Jan. 1941. House, stopped Congress from passing resolutions calling for trials. now is clear the President only was playing for time-time But months went by between the first of the year and explains why the President still prevents the records of the Dec. 1941, as the plans of the Japanese attack matured, Roberts Commission and the testimony of its 127 witnesses being to be better prepared- for the American people to "catch up," mentally and for some strange reason there was less and less emphasis sur- made public. morally, with commitments, made and to be made. prise attack on the fleet at Pearl Harbor by air, more and more on It explains the Presidential order which forbade Admiral J. The Atlantic Conference between Churchill and Roosevelt set- sabotage Hooper year more ago to testify about Pearl Harbor to a com- seven warning messages from Washington to Short and Kim- mittee of tled the policy of a united front between the U. S. and England Congress mel, recorded in the Roberts report, in addition to the one in Jan- no information has been given out to the in- toward Japan. uary from Secretary Knox, four sabotage vestigation by Admiral Hart, at the suggestion Secretary Knox That this was true seems implicit in the following from None, Knox warning, referred to the possibility of sur- explains investigation number 4, now being held behind address to Parliament on Jan. 28, 1942, about seven weeks attack by the closed doors after Pearl Harbor: Twice, in warnings and instructions from Wash- White House pressure had succeeded in substituting secret hear- been the policy of the Cabinet at almost all costs to avoid embroilment with Japan until we were sure that the United States ington, General Short reported to Washington he had taken all pre- ing number for proposed resolution of Congress calling for cautions against sabotage. immediate court-martial of Short and Kimmel. be engaged Editor's Note: This editorial is published by The New Bedford (Mass.) Standard-Times as a patriotic public service. Republication in whole or in part permitted.